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 The statistical data are based mainly on the 2001 census (Source: National Statistical Institute,1
http://www.nsi.bg/Census_e/Census_e.htm), with small additions based on other sources. However, there is a
difference between ethnic self-identification (on which the census data are based) and ethnic identification by others.
The Turkish minority thus is estimated to be smaller than the census results indicate, as a number of Muslim Roma
and Pomaks have identified themselves as ethnic Turks in the census. The Roma, on the other hand, are estimated to
be about 700 000-800 000.
 This phrase was coined by the historian Dimitri Obolensky, the author of The Byzantine Commonwealth:2
Eastern Europe 500-1453. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1971.
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UNEASY TOLERANCE: INTERRELIGIOUS RELATIONS IN BULGARIA AFTER
THE FALL OF COMMUNISM
Ina Merdjanova
Ina Merdjanova is the Director of the Center for Interreligious Dialogue and
Conflict Prevention at the Scientific Research Department of Sofia University,
Bulgaria. She received her PhD from Sofia University in 1995, and has held visiting
fellowships at Oxford University and other institutions in the UK and Germany. She
is the author and editor of a number of books in Bulgarian as well as of a
monograph in English (Religion, Nationalism, and Civil Society in Eastern Europe -
The Postcommunist Palimpsest, published by Edwin Mellen Press in 2002). Dr.
Merdjanova’s recent research has been focused on Muslims and interreligious
relations in the Balkans.
I. Statistical Data and Historical Background
Religious self-identification:1
Bulgarian Orthodox: 6 552 751  (82.64%)
Muslims: 966 978 (12.2%), of which 85 733 Shiites (7.7% of all Muslims)
Undeclared: 283 309 (3.57%)
Catholics: 43 811 (0.55%) (plus 18 000 Eastern-rite Catholics)
Protestants: 42 308 (0.53%)
Unknown: 24 807 (0.31%)
Other: 14 937 (0.19%), of which 1 363 (0.02%) Jews
Total: 7 928 901
Ethnic minorities:
Roma: 370 908 (4.7%) – Estimates: 700 000 – 800 000 (8.8-10.1%)
Turks: 746 664 (9.4%) – Estimates: 600 000 – 700 000 (7.6-8.8%)
Pomaks: Not listed in census results – Estimates 200 000 – 270 000 (2.5-3.4%)
Tatars: 4 515
The first Bulgarian medieval state was established in 681 by Prince Asparuh, and the
mass conversion of Bulgarians to Christianity took place two centuries later, in 864, under
Prince Boris I.  In the beginning, the Bulgarian church was an autonomous archbishopric
under the jurisdiction of the Constantinopolitan Patriarchate. By way of its Christianization,
the Bulgarian kingdom became part of the so-called “Byzantine commonwealth”,  which was2
 While the dominant principle of Church-State relations in the Christian West has been expressed by the3
idea of the “two spheres”, or the separation of ecclesiastical and secular authorities (“Render the things of Caesar unto
Caesar and the things of God unto God.”), the construction of these relations in the Christian East has been dominated
by the vision of a “symphony” (Eusebius of Caesarea, IV c.) between the power of the secular government and the
spiritual authority of the Church. In Byzantium the emperor was formally seen as an “external apostle” of the Church
(as Eusebius of Caesarea has called Constantine the Great), who was able to intervene powerfully in the activities and
policies of the latter. Sometimes these two theories are called “papocaesarism” vs. “caesaropapism”; however these
designations are disputable. Only extreme cases, such as the replacement by Peter the Great in the early XVIII c. of
the Russian Patriarchate with a Holy Synod, headed by a lay procurator appointed by the tsar, represent clear examples
of caesaropapism in Eastern Christianity.
 This issue is discussed in detail in: Daniela Kalkandjieva, The Bulgarian Orthodox Church and the4
‘People’s Democracy’ 1948-1953. Silistra: DEMOS Foundations, 2002 (in Bulgarian).
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dominated by the Eastern Christian, or Byzantine, ritual and canonical model of Christianity
and the attendant church-state relations.  3
The Ottoman conquest of the Balkan peninsula in the XIV-XV century put an end to
the Bulgarian medieval kingdom and its autonomous church, subordinating completely the
latter to the Constantinopolitan Patriarchate. The Ottomans established the so-called millet
system, wherein the millets were self-governing units, based on the confessional affiliation of
the various populations and administered by the respective religious hierarchy. This specific
style of societal organization privileged religious belonging over ethnic or national identities.
Consequently, the struggle for the establishment of independent nation-states everywhere in
the Balkans throughout the XIX century involved as an indispensable component the
establishment/restoration of autonomous national churches. The Bulgarian Church was
reinstated in the form of an autonomous Exarchate in 1870; however the latter was renounced
as schismatic by the Patriarch of Constantinople, because of the non-canonical way in which
the autonomy was achieved (the Church was declared autonomous by a decree of the Turkish
sultan).
In 1878 Bulgarian people gained independence from the Ottomans and proclaimed
their own nation-state, however, the schism of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church was abolished
only in 1945, while the Bulgarian Patriarchate was restored in 1952. Why was this
accomplished only with the coming of the communists to power? The goal of the communist
regime was, of course, not to bolster the prestige of the Church; this important act aimed to
cut off the influence of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and to promote closer ties with the
Russian Orthodox Church, which was an additional way of bringing the two nations closer
together.4
The communists abolished religious education, confiscated church property and
launched attacks on the clergy, thereby overtaking completely the management of the
 Believers could not be members of the Communist Party, which in itself barred them from pursuing5
prosperous careers. Those attending church were under surveillance of the special security agencies and persistence
often meant a job loss. No wonder that believers gradually came to be seen as second-class citizens.
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Church. The latter was gradually marginalized  and turned into an obedient tool of the new5
regime. 
After the collapse of the communist regime the Bulgarian Orthodox Church gained
an opportunity to recover from its spiritual and institutional stagnation. In 1991 the
ecclesiastical academy was restored to its initial statute of a Theological Faculty within Sofia
University, and since the academic year 2001/02 it has offered a four-year bachelor studies
program, as well as a two-year masters program. A second theological faculty at Veliko
Turnovo University has been established, and theology has been also introduced as a
discipline at Shumen and Plovdiv Universities. However, the Church met the postcommunist
challenges extremely weakened by its communist legacy, ranging from being infested with
communist pawns, to strict control preventing anybody with higher-than-average grades to
enroll in the ecclesiastical academy, to having a crippled and corrupted church leadership
which continued to perpetuate itself after collapse of the old regime. The Church was torn
apart by heated debates over the past compromises of its hierarchy. In 1992 the Bulgarian
Orthodox Church went through one of the most tragic experiences in its history. It was
divided into two, not without the active interference of the state authorities, which registered
and thus legitimated an alternative Holy Synod. Consequently, many attempts for healing the
rift remained without result. The Church failed to address constructively the complex,
disastrous and far-reaching consequences of its internal split. Another serious challenge
confronting the Bulgarian Orthodox Church during the last fifteen years has been the new
experience of a political, cultural and religious pluralism, for which the Church was largely
unprepared and had neither an adequate theological, nor an effective sociological
methodology.
2.  Other Religious Communities
Despite the fact that Eastern Christianity has been the predominant religion of most
Bulgarians throughout the centuries, the religious history of Bulgaria is not just the history of
the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, but also comprises the histories of the Muslim, the Jewish
and other Christian communities who have lived side by side for centuries. It should not go
 About the Muslim population in Bulgaria, see Alexander Popovic, “The Turks of Bulgaria (1878-1985).”6
Central Asia Survey. Vol. 5, No. 2, 1986, pp. 1-32; Ali Eminov, Turkish and Other Muslim Minorities in Bulgaria.
London (Hurst) 1997; Wolfgang Höpken, “From Religious Identity to Ethnic Mobilisation: The Turks of Bulgaria
before, under and since Communism.” In: Hugh Poulton and Suha Taji-Faruki (eds.), Muslim Identity and the Balkan
State. London (Hurst) 1997, pp. 54-82; Yulian Konstantinov, “Strategies for Sustaining a Vulnerable Identity: The
Case of the Bulgarian Pomaks.” In: Hugh Poulton and Suha Taji-Faruki (eds.), Muslim Identity and the Balkan State.
London (Hurst) 1997, pp. 33-53.
 Wolfgang Höpken, “From Religious Identity…”, p. 69.7
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unnoticed that other religious communities, too, suffered repression at the hands of the
communists.
The Muslim community is the second largest in Bulgaria. The communist policies
toward Muslim minorities in the country were highly voluntaristic and underwent
considerable alterations between 1945 and 1989. Perceiving Islam as a serious obstacle to the
integration of Turks and other Muslims into Bulgarian society, the Communist party
attempted to create a “socialist Turkish minority”.  It suppressed religious identification and6
encouraged the development of a secular elite among the ethnic Turkish citizens through the
improvement of their educational and cultural conditions. As a result of the restrictions and
the oppression of the communist regime and under the influence of Kemalist Turkey, the
primary identity focus for the country’s Turkish minority changed from religion to ethnicity.
In the 1970s and 1980s the traditional names of the Muslims were forcibly changed into
Bulgarian ones, and severe measures against religious practice and the public use of the
Turkish language were introduced. More than 350 000 Bulgarian Turks left the country for
Turkey (of whom about 100 000 later returned). Despite the communist government’s efforts
to undermine the religious affiliation of the Muslim and Turkish population through anti-
Islamic propaganda, confiscation of the property of charitable foundations (waqfs), the
reduction of the number of functioning mosques, and the persecution of religious leaders,
Turks and other Muslims persisted in performing their traditional rites based on Islam. Even
surveys conducted under communism in the 1970s and early 1980s confirmed that religiosity
among Turkish population was twice as high as that among the Bulgarians. In 1985 only 25
per cent of the ethnic Bulgarians declared that they were religious, in contrast to 55 per cent
of the Turks.  In the context of the new processes, which started with the end of communism,7
the presence of Muslims has become more visible and pronounced. They gained new
opportunities for religious and cultural revitalization, on the one hand, and for political
mobilization, on the other. Civil society organizations and associations oriented towards the
problems of the Muslims mushroomed throughout the country. Three Muslim schools and an
 During the 1992 census about 35 000 Pomaks in the district of Blagoevgrad identified themselves as ethnic8
Turks, which led to nation-wide protest and the subsequent nullification of the census results on ethnic identity,
mother tongue and religious belief for this district.
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Islamic higher education institute provide for the educational needs of the community, while
more than 1 000 mosques and prayer houses organize its religious life. A political party
representing the Muslim population (the Movement for Rights and Freedoms) appeared, and
it has been represented in every parliament since 1990. The political leaders of the Movement
for Rights and Freedoms have been very careful to preclude any identification with Islamist
or pan-Turkist ideas. They use an essentially secular and moderate language in their programs
and statements. The Movement has been open to all Bulgarian citizens, in spite of the fact
that it has drawn support primarily from Turks and other Muslims.
The Muslim community in Bulgaria is highly diversified both ethnically (it includes
Turks, Pomaks, Roma and Tatars) and religiously (the Turkish Muslims are divided into
Sunnis and Shiites). The Shiites are known in the country as Aliani, or Kazilbash (“red
head”) after their traditional headgear with 12 stripes representing the 12 imams. Most of the
Kazilbash settled in the northeast part of the country between the XV-XVII c. and were
associated with various Sufi orders active in the Balkans during the Ottoman time. The
Kazilbash have been considered “heterodox”, even heretical, by the majority Sunnis. Because
of periodic persecutions they have tended to conceal their identity and to often represent
themselves as Sunnis. According to the 1992 census, there are 85 733 Shiites in Bulgaria
(7.7% of the Muslim population).
The other three ethnic groups in the Muslim community are the Pomaks, the Roma
and the Tatars. The Pomaks are Bulgarian speaking Muslims, also called Muslims of
Bulgarian ethnic origin. They are a predominantly rural population, mainly living in “Pomak
enclaves” in the Rhodope mountains. After the fall of communism, when their identity was
dramatically challenged by the new realities, the Pomaks have split into three subgroups.
Some of them have emphasized their Bulgarian ethnic affiliation and converted to
Christianity; another part has claimed a Turkish ethnic identity,  and a third group has made8
attempts to construct a new ethnic identity on the basis of Islam. The data on the religious
affiliations of the Roma are highly uncertain, as this population tends to change its religious
self-identification, and is generally divided into a Muslim and various Christian subgroups.
The Tatars numbered 4 515 in 1992 (down from the around 100 000 strong Tatar
community in the 1870s). They live in northeast Bulgaria in areas which are populated
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predominantly with ethnic Turks and tend to assimilate into this population linguistically,
socially and culturally, or to emigrate to Turkey.
The Catholic community was severely persecuted by the communist regime,
because Catholicism was considered the religion of fascism and a vector of foreign influence.
Catholic priests were charged with anti-socialist activities and support to the opposition
parties. In the early 1950s the property of the Catholic parishes was confiscated, all schools,
clubs and colleges were closed, and the Catholic Church was deprived of its legal status. In
1990 relations with the Vatican were re-established and in 2002 the Pope visited Bulgaria.
Today, about 44 000 Roman Catholics and 18 000 Eastern-rite Catholics live in the country.
The two Catholic communities have good co-operative relations.
Various Protestant groups date back from the mid-XIX century, when missionaries
from the US introduced Methodism in northern Bulgaria and Congregationalism to the south.
In 1875 the Protestants formed the Bulgarian Evangelical Philanthropic Society, which was
later transformed into the Union of Evangelical Churches in Bulgaria. Under communism the
property of the Protestant churches was confiscated and many pastors and ordinary believers
were forcefully relocated throughout the country or moved underground. After 1989 the old,
“traditional” for the country Protestant churches were rehabilitated, many new churches were
registered, and a number of Protestant NGOs carrying out educational and religious activities
appeared.  In 1999, a Higher Evangelical Theological Institute was established through the
unification of four different Evangelical schools, which appeared in Bulgaria in the early
1990s.
The Jewish community consists mainly of Sephardic Jews, and also comprises a
small number of Ashkenazi Jews. During WWII the Jews living in Bulgaria (about 50 000)
were saved from deportation to the death camps with the active interference of the leadership
of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church. Considered by the communists a national rather than a
religious group, about 90 percent of the Bulgarian Jews left the country for Israel after WWII.
Today, about 1 300 Jews live in the country.
Apart from these traditional for the country religious minorities, after the fall of
communism a number of new religious movements (NRMs) arrived from Western Europe
and North America. Both the Orthodox Church and the society at large reacted with anxiety
and fear to the emerging religious pluralism. The common perception, fostered powerfully by
most of the representations in the media, and evident in designations like “destructive cults”
 These data support the observation of Eileen Barker that in Eastern Europe “for a sizeable proportion of9
the population, pluralism, in the sense of a peaceful co-existence of alternative religions, has been, and for many
remains, an alien concept”. Eileen Barker. “But ‘Who’s  going  to win?’ National and Minority Religions In
Postcommunist Society.” In: Nembach, Ulrich, Heinrich Rusterholz & Paul Zulehner (eds.). Informationes Theologiae
Europae. Internationales ökumenisches Jahrbuch für Theologie. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1998, pp. 11-39, here
p. 20.
 Neli Hadzhiiska. “Za nyakoi problemi, svarzani s novite religiozni dvizhenia v Bulgariya” [On Some10
Problems Connected with the New Religious Movements in Bulgaria]. In: Filosofski alternativi. No. 3, 1995, pp. 139-
53, here p. 145
 Todor Petkov. Putevoditel za dukhovnite obshnosti v Bulgaria [Guidebook about the spiritual communities11
in Bulgaria]. Sofia: Litavra, 1998.
 The observation that Bulgarian society is one of the most secular (see for instance David Martin.12
Forbidden Revolution. Pentecostalism in Latin America, Catholicism in Eastern Europe. Macon: Mercer University
Press, 1996, p. 9, and Sabrina Ramet. Social Currents in Eastern Europe. The Sources and Consequences of the Great
Transformation. Durham & London: Duke University Press, 1995, p. 157) is confirmed by the data quoted in Neli
Hadzhiiska, Za nyakoi.., here pp. 145-46. The latter points out that in 1990 only 4 percent of those interviewed
answered in the affirmative the question whether they believed in God. I remain sceptical as to whether the data
supplied by Hadzhiiska on a subsequent huge growth of those claiming to be “believers” (25 percent in 1991 and 63
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and “dangerous sects,” was highly negative. NRMs were seen as a threat to the national
identity, because they were said to promote the interests of foreign missions and
organizations; they were considered harmful by the Church, because they allegedly eroded its
newly gained position in society by robbing it from what it saw to be its legitimate flock; they
were also deemed to be destructive to family life, as they often fueled conflict between
younger converts and their parents.
A 1993 sociological investigation into the prevailing social views on NRMs in
Bulgaria showed that 68 percent of those interviewed held that the activity of alternative
religions in the country should be forbidden, while half of all those interviewed were
convinced that new religions had no place in a democratic society.   The investigation9
revealed clearly the prevailing intolerance and lack of understanding among the general
Bulgarian public about the nature of the processes of democratization. People were not ready
to accept the legitimacy of alternative religious formations or to coexist peacefully with them.
In fact, a considerable decline in the size and significance of NRMs seems already to
be an emerging trend everywhere in Eastern Europe. The influx of NRMs and the rapid rise
in their membership in the first years after the fall of communism has ceased. According to
data quoted by Hadzhiiska,  in 1993 about one percent of the Bulgarian population, that is10
about 85 000 people, had been registered as members of alternative religious movements. The
approximate number of adherents of NRMs which I counted on the basis of data given by
Petkov  for the different religious communities (in a book of interviews with their leaders)11
showed that their membership had dropped to about one tenth of what it had been just five
years earlier. I relate this decline to the fact that Bulgarian society is highly secularised  and12
percent in 1992) reflect the real state of affairs.
 The practice of “komshiluk” in the Balkan countries dates back to the Ottoman time and practically can13
be found in all settings with mixed population. Tone Bringa, for example, has observed it during her anthropological
study in a Muslim-Croat Bosnian village just before the recent war in Bosnia. According to Bringa, while following
clear obligations of reciprocity and mutual help on a number of occasions, the two ethno-religious groups strictly
preserved their distinctions. An important way of sustaining their boundaries was by prohibiting intermarriage
between members of the two groups. Tone Bringa. Being Muslim the Bosnian Way: Identity and Community in a
Central Bosnian Village. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.
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to the relative stabilization of the religious market in the country. Various new religions have
found their niches of socialization and have more or less predictable modes of function.
3. Interreligious and Inter-ethnic Relations.
Negative tolerance
In contrast to the generally intolerant attitudes toward the NRMs, which came to the
country after the fall of communism, sociological surveys have revealed a considerably high
level of religious tolerance among and toward the so-called “traditional religions.” Normally,
Christians and Muslims live peacefully side by side. The well-known practice of heterodox
Dervish orders in worshipping saints and shrines drew Muslims and Christians closer
together. In the past, Muslims and Christians often shared the offering to a common saint, as
well as a number of symbiotic practices. Even today Muslims and Christians share a few
pilgrimage sites (for example Demir Baba Tekke in northeast Bulgaria ).
A nuanced understanding of tolerance, however, differentiates between negative and
positive tolerance (also called by some authors passive and active tolerance). Generally,
“negative tolerance” is a position of pragmatic non-interference and putting up with
difference, while “positive tolerance” means not just enduring and bearing with religiously
others, but embracing an active attitude of respect and appreciation for the value of
difference. For example, a test for positive tolerance is whether the particular religious
community is ready to protect other religions’ freedom as one’s own. 
I want to argue that manifestations of negative tolerance seem to prevail in Bulgaria.
The established Christian-Muslim relations, for example, fit neatly into the model of
“komshiluk” (from the Turkish word “komshiya”, meaning “neighbour”), according to which
people of different ethnic or religious groups live peacefully and even co-operatively in close
proximity, yet the groups preserve their structural and cultural differences and their
boundaries remain well-sustained and generally unbridgeable.  13
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Intracommunal Power Struggles
In recent Bulgarian history there have not been conflicts, generated and/or related to
interreligious controversies. Yet, after 1989, there have been a number of heated intra-
religious disputes, related to internal power struggles and contests over who gets to speak on
behalf of each particular community and to control its property. The Muslim community went
through a serious split, very similar to the one experienced in the Orthodox Church. The
severe contest over the post of the Chief Mufti has led to the establishment of rival Muslim
councils, selecting rival chief muftis, and subsequent lawsuits, accompanied by mutual
accusations and bitter fights in the media.
On the whole, religious communities remain relatively closed and focused on their
own problems, which are by no means negligible in the postcommunist context. Therefore
the positive resolving of their intra-communal tensions and problems is of primary
importance for their sustainable development. However, the continued introversion carries
the risk of the reinforcement of a specific fortress mentality, inherited from the communist
time. Obviously, interreligious dialogue in this situation is of particular exigency, because
such a dialogue will bring new experience and perspectives, which could help for the
resolving of communities’ internal controversies.
Barriers to Interreligious Dialogue
An important barrier to interreligious dialogue remains the inequality in terms of
social power and influence (majority versus minority religions), and the construction of a
national identity around the religious identification of the majority population—Orthodoxy.
This construction provides a clear example of a powerful interplay between religion and
politics, and of the appropriation of the religious discourse by the project of nation(alism).
Another serious obstacle is the generally rather poor level of religious education in
Bulgarian society. People seem to be ignorant not only of the religious teaching and practice
of the others, but of their own religious tradition as well. In this situation, the potentially
inflammatory role of the media in fuelling negative attitudes and intolerance by selective and
tendentious reporting is not to be neglected. Prevailing religious ignorance, coupled with
manipulative, sensationalist and oftentimes also religiously un(der)educated media can in the
long run prove to be a formula for interreligious tensions and even conflicts.
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Conclusion
On the whole, since 1989 Bulgaria has made significant progress in the (closely
related) areas of inter-ethnic and interreligious relations. It has reversed communist
assimilation campaigns, introduced mother tongue education for minority children, as well as
religious education. Moreover, it has adopted a number of important legislative documents,
such as the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National
Minorities, a comprehensive government program for the integration of the Roma minority
(the “Framework Program”), and a Law on Protection against Discrimination. In December
2002, the government passed a new law on religion, which replaced the old one from 1949.
However, changes in policy and legislature have not always been followed through
and put into practice. Interreligious tolerance, on the other hand, while present in society, has
remained uneasy and along the lines of what I called above “negative tolerance.” This all
proves once again how difficult the creation of a culture of tolerance (or what Robert Bellah
would call tolerant “habits of the heart”) is, even after considerable structural changes have
been carried through.
